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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,

]
Case No, 900147-CA

Plaintiff-Respondent,

;

vs.

;i

RAYMOND J. VIGIL,

]

Defendant-Appellant.

Priority 2

]

BRIEF OF DEFENDANT-APPELLANT
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This
Title

II,

appeal
Utah

Defendant-Appellant

is taken pursuant to the provision of Rule 3,
Rules

of

Appellate

Procedure

in

which

appeals his conviction from the District Court,

Second Judicial District, Davis County, State of Utah.
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This

is an Appeal

Defendant-Appellant
second

was

from

convicted

a

criminal

conviction

in which

of (1) Burglary, a felony of the

degree, in that he is alleged to have entered into a dwelling

with intent to commit a theft and (2) Habitual Criminal.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR APPEAL
The issues presented in this appeal are:
1.

Did the officer have reasonable grounds or suspicion to

follow Defendant's car and make an investigative stop?
2.

Was the arrest of the Defendant and all other occupants

of the auto proper or was it a pretext to impound the car?
3.

Was

the owner's consent to search the vehicle freely

and voluntarily given.
DETERMINATIVE STATUTE
The following statute is determinative in this case:
United States Constitution, arcvend. IV:
The right of the people to be secure in
their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches 'and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation,
and
particularly
describing
the
place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant-Appellant
a

second

76-6-202.

degree

was

in violation

Defendant moved

Defendant was
before

felony

was charged with Burglary of a dwelling,

convicted

of Utah Code Annotated Sec.

to suppress evidence which was denied.

by

jury trial conducted on April 19, 1989

the Honorable Douglas L. Cornaby, District Judge. Defendant

then

tried

Code Annotated,
criminal.

by

jury

under the Habitual Criminal Statute, Utah

Sec. 76-8-1001

Judge Cornaby

and

sentenced

determined
Defendant

to be a habitual
to

the

Utah State

Prison for a term of five years to life.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Defendant-Appellant, Raymond
to as Vigil) was
his

juvenile

Police

one of two passengers in an automobile driven by

nephew.

Officer

saw

J. Vigil (hereinafter referred

All

occupants

of

the car are Hispanic. A

the three Hispanic males in an affluent area of

Bountiful, Utah and became suspicious. The officer had no knowledge
of

a burglary having been committed or any other criminal act on the

part

of

the

vehicle occupants. The officer followed the car for a
-2-

substantial
in a
for
were

distance when he stopped the driver for speeding 45 mph

35 mph

speeding

zone. When the car was stopped, the driver was cited
and

arrested

and

normally citation
(mother

open

container.

transported
only

to

All three occupants of the car
jail

and the car impounded for

type of cases. The owner of the automobile

of the driver) contacted the police later that evening. She

requested
implied

information

of her

automobile.

The arresting officer

that the car must be searched before being released to her.

She gives

a guarded consent. The car is searched without a warrant

and items from a burglary are found in the car.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Defendant
unreasonable
automobile
were

searches and seizures. The police officer followed the
in which

three

speeding

Hispanic

Defendant was a passenger solely because there
occupants

in an auto in East Bountiful. The

citation was a pretext resulting from the officers trailing

Defendant
arrested
container

in excess of 23 blocks within Bountiful City. The officer
the driver

The

voluntary

consent

trunk

and

two passengers

violations, thereby

vehicle.

car

is entitled to Fourth Amendment protection against

is

necessitating

subsequent warrantless
and

illegally

is

for

search

speeding

and open

impoundment

of the

is without free and

illegal. The items confiscated from the

seized

evidence which

suppressed by the trial court.

-3-

should

have been

ARGUMENT
POINT ONE
DID THE ARRESTING OFFICER HAVE REASONABLE SUSPICION
FOLLOW DEFENDANT'S AUTO AND MAKE AN INVESTIGATIVE STOP?
Defense
stipulated
17,

Prosecutor

Harward

to the facts of the auto stop by officer Johns.

(Tl. 13,

18)

Counsel

Deputy

Vanderlinden

Johns

saw

three male

Hispanics

traveling

suspicious

and

550

1100 East, Bountiful to 1130 North 400 East in Bountiful,

(Tl.

turns

affluent Bountiful

in an

automobile

South

in an

and

TO

area. He becomes

around and follows the car from approximately

74) a distance of approximately 24 blocks until he determines a

speed

violation.

Officer

Johns has no knowledge of a burglary or

any other criminal offense having occurred.
Based
no basis

on

objective and articulable facts, Officer Johns had

to document a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity to

justify

an

investigatory

State v. Carpena,
Annotated

714

Sec. 77-7-15
a

stop

P.2d

of

Defendant's

674, 675

(1982).

(Utah

automobile.

1986);

Utah Code

He followed the vehicle 24 blocks

obviously

on

"hunch", eventually

citation.

This Court has clearly

culminating

set

in a

speeding

forth the standards which

govern

police officer's actions in circumstances such as the instant

case.

In

972

the easel,

(Utah App.

similar

1988)

to the case

State of Utah v. Sigifredo Sierra, 754 P.2d
this Court addressed a factual circumstance

at bar.

In

Sierra, this Court adopts the

Three transcripts have been prepared and each numbered sequentially. Therefore the transcript of the suppression hearing
shall be designated Tl; the trial as T2 and the Habitual Criminal
transcript as T3
-4-

Brignoni-Ponce,
a

stop

422 U.S. at 885, 95 S.Ct. at 2582, test of whether

is a pretext. We must make an objective assessment of the

officer's

actions

confronting

him

at

in

light

the

time

of

the

facts

and

circumstances

to determine the true purpose of the

stop and search.
The Trial
found

Court applied

the arresting

violation

officer

this

had

form of test but mistakenly

immediately perceived

a speed

(Tl. 35-36) when in fact the officer trailed the car for

23+ blocks before citing a violation of speed.
This Court held in Sierra, that
...in traffic violation stops, in balancing the rights
of individuals to be free from arbitrary interference
by law enforcement officers and the government's interest in crime prevention and public protection, if a
hypothetical officer would not have stopped the driver
for the cited traffic offense and the surrounding circumstances indicate the stop is a pretext, the stop is
unconstitutional.
This Court

further

adopted

States v. Robinson,
"...very

471 F.2d

few drivers

language

from

1082,

the dissent in United

(D.C. Cir. 1972) which states

can traverse any appreciable distance without

violating some traffic regulation."
The arresting officer followed his hunch based solely on the
nationality
riding.

No

officer's
car

of

in a

the

occupants

of

the car

in which Defendant was

reasons existed to stop the car at the inception of the

observation. No reasonable officer would have stopped the
reasonable distance, say

circumstances

point

4-5

blocks. All surrounding

to a pretext stop by the arresting officer and

the ensuing search was unconstitutional.
-5-

POINT TOO
THE ARREST OF THE DEFENDANT AND ALL OTHER OCCUPANTS OF THE
CAR WAS A PRETEXT TO IMPOUND AND THEREBY INVENTORY SEARCH THE CAR.
The driver
mph

in a

35 mph

automobile.
for

open

time

of

of

the automobile was charged with speeding 45

zone and

The Defendant

container

of

suspicions

alcohol.

about

officer's determination
offenses

open

container of alcohol in an

and second passenger were both arrested

arrest, the officer

specific

the

for

It is very pertinent that at the

had

the

no

other

occupants.

to arrest

criminal
Although

individuals

charges or
the police

for these kinds of

is discretionary, very rarely is arrest utilized. Giving

offenders a citation to appear is the standard practice in Davis

County, State
open

of

Utah.

container

practice.

Impounding an auotmobile for speeding and

offenses

The arrest

is clearly

unusual

and

not standard

in the case at bar is so out of the ordinary

that when viewed in the totality of the circumstances (the officer's
trailing

for

trunk;

the

because

of

arrest.
search

23 blocks; the

officer's

commitment

to search the

impound of a car for speeding; the attraction to the car
the

occupants' race)

it can only be deemed a pretext

The arrest was a subterfuge to search the vehicle and the
was

therefore

illegal

Lane v. Commonwealth,

386 S.W. 2d

743, 10 ALR3d 308.
For
traffic

a

search

citation

contemporaneously
which

Defendant

of

to be
with

an automobile incident to an arrest for a
valid, the search must have been conducted

the arrest.

In the case at tar, the auto in

was a passenger was towed to Dewaal's in Bountiful,
-6-

Utah.

The

car

was

locked

circumstances, a warrantless
point
will

fenced yard.

Given

these

search is not justified since at this

(1) the need to search for weapons is minimal (2) no evidence
(3) there was no danger of the car being driven

be destroyed

away.

in a

The U.S. Supreme Court held

warrantless
Amendment

search,

of

inadmissable

evidence derived from such a

as violation

of

the Fourth

the U.S. Constitution. Preston v. United States, 376

U.S. 364, 11 L.ed. 2d 277, 84 S.Ct. 881.
The
automobile

Supreme Court had
searches

some

reasonable

made.

General

other

after

relation

further

arrest
to

for

consistently

ruled

that

traffic citations must have

the offense for which the arrest was

exploratory searches made solely to find evidence of

wrongdoing are unconstitutional and evidence derived therefrom

is not admissable

United States v. Tate, 209 F.Supp 762; Am Jur,

Searches & Seizures (1st ed. Sec. 19)
The officer's
this area.
container

of

locked

pointless
of

in the case at bar falls directly in

The evidence he needs to sustain a conviction for open
alcohol

Furthermore, it
the

actions

trunk

is
of

in a

vehicle is already in his possession.

irrelevant

if additional alcohol were found in

an automobile

and

therefore

any search is

except to find evidence of other wrongdoing. On the issue

speeding, no

further

evidence could

possibly be found in the

trunk that has a relation to the speeding charge.
POINT THREE
WAS THE OWNER'S CONSENT
VOLUNTARILY GIVEN?

TO

-7-

SEARCH THE VEHICLE FREELY AND

In
that a

State v. Sierra,

search

Fourth

this Court followed the majority view

conducted pursuant to voluntary consent is valid for

Amendment analysis and that "voluntary" consent cannot be the

result

of

duress

or

Schnockloth v. Bustamontef

coercion,

express

412 U.S.218, 219, 93

or

implied.

S.Ct.

2041; 36

L.ed.2d 854.
In the case at bar, Officer John made telephone contact with
the owner

of

conversation

the automobile

in question, a Sally Salazar. This

took place after the arrest of Defendant and impound of

the vehicle.

With regards to the issue of voluntariness of consent

to search, officer John's conversation is defective on two points:
1.

Officer

John

implies that Mrs. Salazar cannot get her

car released until he looks through it (Tl.9).
2.
right

Officer

John

implies

to Mrs. Salazar that he has a

to search the car trunk because he has the key but can't do so

because

the key

the purpose

is damaged (Tl.7,8).

Officer John further implies

of the search is to make sure nothing is missing (Tl.9)

or to simply "make sure everything is okay" (T1.10).
Based
will

on

Officer

not get her

merely

for

implied

threat that Mrs. Salazar

car back without a search and that the search is

the purpose of insuring nothing is missing is a flagrant

misrepresentation
consent

John's

(Tl.9)

of

the

is not

facts and

voluntary,

law. Mrs. Salazar's strained
is coerced, and

is based on

deliberate misrepresentation of facts by Officer John.
CONCLUSION
Officer

John has

singled
-8-

out

the automobile

in which

Defendant was a passenger solely because of their nationality. The
facts of the case indicate the officer was determined to investigate
the occupants
tailing

of

can be

the arrest
reasonable
not have

of

A

speeding charge after 23 blocks of

nothing more than a pretext which is compounded by
all

officer
taken

the car.

occupants

on citation

only type offenses. A

given officer John's knowledge at the time would

the action he did. The improper stop, arrest, and

impoundment

should

auto

under misrepresentation and duress by Officer John. All

owner

not be cured

by the consent obtained from the

evidence obtained as a result of the search should be suppressed.
Respectfully submitted this

/(?

day of/June, 1990.

^WEPHEN I. ODA, Attorney for
'Defendant-Appellant
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I, STEPHEN
(4) true

and

Appellant

to

depositing

I. ODA, hereby certify that I have nailed four

accurate copies oE the aforegoing Brief of Defendantthe

same

following
in

persons at the following addresses, by

the U.S. Mail, postage prepaid, on the / ^ ^ day

of June, 1990:
SANDRA SJOGREN
Attorney Generalfs Office
236 State Capital
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114

Stephen I. Oda
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ADDENDUM
TO BRIEF

STATE OF UTAH
vs.
RAYMOND VIGIL

Case No. 900147-CA

p

IL£®

Al
COUf?T

2 ,9$0
o - A P P 4 , LS

"Q

And then the car was supposed to stay at

your house?"

"A

Yes."

"Q

Do you have any idea why he would be in

Bountiful? n

I

"A

I have no idea."

M

Okay.

"A

He was supposed to have been by himself."

M

He was supposed to be by himself?"

"A

Yes."

"Q

Virgil wasn't supposed to be with him?"

"A

Nobody was supposed to be with him."

"Q

Okay.

Q

Who —

Who was supposed to be with

him?"

Q

Where's all the keys to the vehicle

ottefir than than the...."

"A

Well, I have okay, the ignition key, I

have that <Dn there, but the trunk key is messed up.
So I was g<5tting it to get fixed 'cause it's bent,
really damaged."
M

So you can't get into the trunk?"

"A

I can't get into the trunk.

Q

And, you

know, I take back the original key which not really,
won't even go into the hole to open the trunk."
"Q

"A

%

So what about the glove box?"
The glove box is the same key as the

roam zHickzn

Court Reporter

trunk."
"Q

And it was on the ring; right?"

"A

It was supposed to have been there on the

ring."
"Q

But it —

you can't get it into the trunk

at all?"
"A

I can't get into the trunk 'cause the

key's no good."
"Q

Okay."

"A

I left my son —

left that key with his

uncle and that, but you see" (Not audible) "somebody
else to fix the keys.

But I don't know.

I haven't

talked with my brother yet or not."
"Q

But he was supposed to get that key fixed

for^you, and you don't know whether he's done that or
not?"
"A

I don't know whether he's done that or

not. "
"Q

Is it possible that your boy headed out

with your brother and got the key?"
"A

Umm, I've had —

umm, I have no idea.

could be possible, though."
"Q

Okay."

"A

When I talked to my son, I was pretty

angry.

I didn't even ask him anything.

town cHicKLn

I just

Court Reporter

It

wanted to know where —

where my car was and what the

hell was going on."
"Q

Do you know who Armando is?"

"A

I —

"Q

But you know Virgil?"

"A

Virgil?"

"Q

Uh-huh (affirmative)."

"A

No, I don't know Armando."

Umm, no, not...."

"Q

Virgil Raymond or Raymond Virgil?"

"A

Raymond Vigil, I do."

"Q

And who is that?"

"A

Umm, he's related, umm, to my friend, to

•his father."
"Q

Well, we need to look through your car

before we can let it go.

Is that all right with

you?"
"A

Umm, will I have to be there?"

"Q

No, you don't have to be there.

been a list done on the car.
missing or anything.
it.

There's

Nothing's going to be

We just need to look through

But we want to make sure that's all right with

you. "
"A

Yeah.

Yeah, I guess so."

"&

So that is fine with you?"

"A

Uh-huh (affirmative)."

town

s.n Court Reporter

9

"Q

And what was your name?"

"A

My name's Salazar."

"Q

Salazar?"

"A

Uh-huh (affirmative)."

"Q

Okay, and that car does come back to you?"

"A

Yeah.

It is my car."

"Q

Okay.

What's your current address?"

"A

334 East 1300 South."

"Q

1300 South?"

"A

Uh-huh (affirmative)."

"Q

In Salt Lake City?"

"A

Yes."

"Q

And what's your phone number?"

"A

466-4724."

"Q

Okay.

You can give them a call and see if

they'll release that car to you.

And like I said, if

it's all right, we'll go down and look at it and make
sure everything's okay."
"A

Umm, you don't have —

you don't —

you

don't happen to have" (Not audible)
"Q

You what?"

"A

You don't happen to — "

"Q

The telephone number?"

"A*

The telephone number, yeah."

"Q

292-8036."

\OVJYI £7Tic,hz.n

Court Reporter

10

1

which defendant was riding was stopped.

It deals

2 J with the lawfulness of the search of the vehicle and
seizure of evidence from the vehicle.
Mr. Vanderlinden and I have had a
5 I conversation, and I anticipate we'll be able to
6

stipulate for purposes of the suppression hearing on

7

some evidence.

8

make my best effort to recite the stipulated facts.

9

And if the Court will allow, I'll now

The date in question is the 14th of January

10

1989. The city we are concerned with is Bountiful.

11

The residence involved was secured by the owner at

12

2 o'clock in the afternoon.

13

discovered at approximately 4:21 in the afternoon of

14

the same day. On that day, J.R. John who is a deputy

15

De^fis County sheriff paramedic was on duty in the

16

Bountiful area, had an associate from the sheriff's

17

department with him.

18

The burglary was

And at approximately 3:06 p.m. on that

19

day, he saw the vehicle in question in the same area

20

of town where the burglarized house is. At that

21

moment in time, Deputy John knew nothing of the —

22

had no information whatsoever, and he didn't learn

23

about a burglary until a substantial time later.

24

When he*saw the car, there was circumstances that

25

attracted his attention to it. He is a certified

3\dly

!B%oi»n zHlcizsn Court Reporter

Court has listened to the tape.

I would rather have

the Court listen to the tape rather than recite what
Mr. Harward said.
THE COURT:

I have listened to the tape.

MR. VANDERLINDEN:

Thank you-

And I submit it

on that, your Honor.
THE COURT:

Thank you.

MR. HARWARD:

Let me look at this motion to see

if I have recited the facts that would be towards the
issues.
Yes, your Honor, it is praying in the
motion to suppress that there was not a search
-•warrant for the vehicle.
14

That is true.

j warrants to search the vehicle.

There was no

And it also is true

that there was not a warrant to seize the shoes.
Mr. Vanderlinden?
MR. VANDERLINDEN:

Yes.

Carvel, there are a

couple of facts that should be in evidence if I could
address the Court.
I would stipulate if those people were
called to testify that's what they would testify to,
your Honor.

There are a couple of additional facts

to be brought in evidence.
If Officer Johns —
Court —

I would like the

It is my understanding the first thing that

xoujn cHickzn

Court Reporter

called his attention to the vehicle prior to the stop
was three Hispanic males in the vehicle, and they
were dressed in a certain way, that they appeared to
be out of California.

Based on that, he turned and

followed the vehicle.

That was the only basis for

it, because there were three Hispanic males in the
vehicle.
THE COURT:

You mean in spite of the speed?

MR. VANDERLINDEN:
speed.

No.

That was before the

The only reason he originally went after that

car was three Hispanic males, as he put it, and one
was dressed —
this word.

and one was dressed —

I don't know

Well, "cholo," c-h-o-l-o.

this in his report.

And he's got

And that's the only reason he

vjgnt after them.
Further, the only thing that Mr. Vigil was
arrested for was an open container of alcoholic
beverage in a vehicle.

Nothing else.

And the other

ones was speeding and an open container.
on those misdemeanors was arrested.
impounded.

And based

The car was

Those are the only arrests that were

made*
And also the times are critical, your
Honor.* If the Court could indicate —

If Detective

Gray were called to testify, first of all, he would
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determined other than an open container in the car.
Based on that, we submit it, your Honor.
MR. HARWARD:
THE COURT:

We submit it.
In ruling on the matter, Irll make

several observations.

What I really need to do is

rule on each one separately because each one really
becomes an individual claim.
First we ought to deal with the stop.

Our

appellate courts have generally said that pretext
stops will not be acceptable.
done.

Sometimes those are

You see a vehicle or a person or persons in a

vehicle, and you decide to stop them and then you
VLook for a violation, and you may find a taillight
out.

You may find they had too thin on the tire,

Hbatever it may be in there.

The appellate courts

say that is just a pretext, and we won't let you use
that pretext to search a vehicle and make inquiry.
Now, it does appear that the stipulated
fact was that Deputy Johns saw the individuals in the
vehicle, and they were Hispanic and they were dressed
in California style, and, umm, were in an area of
Bountiful which was unusual to expect them to be in
that kind of car.

And so he followed them.

And, of

course/ he checked the speed and apparently checked
the speed immediately and they were in the speed
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violation.
1

Under this kind of situation, umm, it does
not appear to the Court that it is a pretext stop and
is in violation he had a right to check for the
speeding.

And it's 10 miles over the speed limit.

And that is the amount that one would —

most

officers would normally stop and ticket a vehicle for
speeding.

So the fact that there are Hispanic

persons in the vehicle seemed to make no difference
at that point in time.

So the stop was proper.

It's also true that normally when there's a
stop for speeding, it's satisfied with a citation.
%You have the further violation apparently that each
of the three in the vehicle, they have open
containers.

They're consuming alcoholic beverages

which is a separate offense for which sometimes a
citation is given and sometimes an arrest made.

You

have a juvenile driving the car who has no right to
use alcohol at all.
Parties didn't really stipulate to the
Court what the facts were with regard to how
intoxicated the parties were except that the State
argued that because of that they had enough
intoxicating liquor that the officer couldn't let any
one of the three drive.

xoixjrt czHickcn Court Reporter

(T2. 74) referred to as (Tl. 74) in Brief
1
2
3

I did, yes, sir.
Q

Did you see a vehicle in that area before

you stopped it?

4

A

Yes, sir, I did.

5

Q

This vehicle eventually stopped.

6

you first see it?

7

A

8

Bountiful.

9

Q

10

Where did

Approximately 550 South 1100 East,

Where was the vehicle when you pulled it to

a stop?

11

A

12

Bountiful.

Approximately 1130 North 400 East in

13

Q

What kind of vehicle was it?

14

A

1975 Monte Carlo.

15

Q

I show you —

16

A

Maroon in color.

17

Q

I show you a photograph of the vehicle

I'm sorry.

18

Jmarked for identification as Exhibit 22.

19

photograph, do you see the same 1975 Monte Carlo that

20

(you're talking about?

In that

21

A

Yes, sir.

22

Q

Does the photograph fairly represent that

23

IL975 Monte Carlo, at least as far as the view that is

24

Displayed in the photograph is concerned?

25

A

Yes, sir, it does.
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